Introduction
This paper considers a problem of social learning with two distinctive features. First, the agents we model are minimally rational; they do not look ahead and do not do Bayesian revision of probabilities, nor do they remember outcomes from the past. Second, they observe only local information-the outcomes of their own experiments in each period and those of their immediate neighbours and they have only the ability to compare averages. The problem we seek to examine is whether, despite these disadvantages, players can all learn to use the superior one of two available technologies.
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Similar issues have recently been considered in models of cultural evolution (Bisin and Verdier(2001) for example) and in models of learning by boundedly rational agents (such as the paper of Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) on word-of-mouth learning, which is discussed at length later on, or of Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998).) Cultural evolution stresses the role of propagation of cultural traits by horizontal transmission or imitation. Here the larger the proportion of individuals with a particular trait, the more likely the trait is to spread, thus creating a pressure towards conformity. The Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked paper adds another dimension to this problem, because individuals change their behaviour not just to conform to the majority view but if they see alternative strategies yielding a greater payoff on average among other agents they are able to observe. Their paper considers a finite number of agents placed in a circle, with each agent able to observe his or her neighbours; the authors obtain a surprisingly optimistic result on the survival of altruism. Of course, an individual altruist might be doing very poorly, but he or she will not change because her neighbouring altruists are doing very well.
We consider in this paper a problem of diffusion of technology, where one technology is better than the other and agents imitate better technologies among their neighbours. This could be interpreted as a model of cultural evolution, since it is based on imitation. As stated earlier, we impose minimal rationality requirements on our agents, so one might regard them as protohumans or automata rather than actual humans. There is some empirical justification, however, for human agents copying successful strategies from their neighbours and friends. Conley and Udry (2000) 2 find some evidence of this among farmers engaged in pineapple cultivation in Ghana, where the appropriate use of fertiliser diffuses by a social learning mechanism that relies on imitation of successful strategies (not just imitation in order to conform). The difficulties involved in identfying the neighbourhood and in distinguishing learning from other effects are non-trivial, but are addressed in their paper.
Specifically, in our model, agents are distributed at integer points on the line. Suppose there are two available technologies, B(lue) and R(ed). Each agent on the (infinite in both directions) line is randomly assigned a technology; that is, each integer site on the line is B or R with a strictly positive probability (for example 1/2). Each agent, labelled henceforth as agent i, i = .... − 3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3..., uses his assigned technology in each period to produce an output, which could either be 1(Success) or 0(Failure).
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The R technology is better than the B technology in the sense that p B < p R , where p B and p R are the probabilities of success with the blue and red technologies respectively.
In any period t, the agents simultaneously and independently perform the experiment with their assigned technologies. Each agent observes his own outcome and the outcomes of his two nearest neighbours. Agents are automata but can learn from one another according to one of the two learning rules to be described. In rule L 1 , the agent never changes technology if his own outcome is a success. If his outcome in a given period t is a failure, he considers himself (site i) as well as sites (i − 1, i + 1). If he is using B and the agents using R have a greater proportion of successes in t than those using B, he switches next period to using R. The process of switching from R to B is analogous. 4 In rule L 2 , agent i always looks around, calculates whether the other technology has a higher proportion of successes among agents {i − 1, i, i + 1} and switches to that technology next period, if this is in fact the case. The two learning rules we consider both have some inertia, namely that a failed Re d(Blue) does not change if its neighbours are two failed Blues(Re ds). L 1 involves a further level of inertia in that an agent who observes a success never switches, even if the other type of technology is doing better in the neighbourhood.
The object of this paper is to investigate the question of whether the better technology diffuses through the population, even though agents only consider current results and do not behave optimally. (This problem, with discounting, is a two-armed bandit problem, where optimal behaviour has been much studied in the literature.)
The main result we obtain is as follows: With rule L 1 , from any initial configuration that has positive probability of occurrence, the better technology diffuses across the entire population with probability 1. With rule L 2 , we have only been able to prove a weaker result, namely that the better technology diffuses with probability 1 from any positive probability initial configuration, if p R is sufficiently greater than p B (in a precise way).
A natural question is whether these results imply the superiority of L 1 , which could be considered as an " If it ain't broke, don't fix it" rule with some inertia in switching, as opposed to L 2 , where a player contemplates switching even if he has had a success using his own technology. Our theoretical results do not answer this question. In the last section, we briefly discuss some simulation results for 1000 agents placed on a circle. We find that the rate of convergence to the better technology is much faster for the learning rule L 2 than for L 1 . The actual rate depends crucially on initial conditions, as the simulation also shows. The rate of drift of the random walk seems to be a lower bound to the rate at which the configuration converges to the better technology. For the rule L 1 , this is (p R − p B ). For L 2 , the expected increase in the number of reds in the first step is (p R − p B )(1 + p R p B ), though the intervals break up, so the rule cannot be modelled directly as a single random walk.
Arguably, the model has aspects that reflect the important questions raised earlier in the introduction. Individuals do learn from their neighbours and better ways of doing things (or "technologies") do spread as a result. It is by no means clear in advance whether the better technology always prevails, whether either could prevail (as is the case with a finite number of agents) or whether the technologies co-exist (as happens frequently in developing countries).
While we have not come across this specific model anywhere, there are related problems that have been considered in at least three different fields, namely physics, probability and the analysis of learning models in economics. In physics, the problem would formally fall in the category of probabilistic cellular automata. A paper by Bhargava, Kumar and Mukherjee (1993) in fact describes a model of new-product diffusion in these terms. (The authors are physicists.) In their model, there is one innovation and each agent is in one of two states-an adopter or non-adopter. Once someone has adopted, he or she never switches to becoming a non-adopter. Any non-adopter with an adopter as a neighbour (the neighbourhood is a two-dimensional chessboard type with eight neighbours), becomes an adopter with probability 1 − x t , where x t → 1 as t → ∞. The authors simulate a 100×100 grid with different seed values of adopters and find, in their simulations, that the initial value of x is crucial in determining the rate at which adoption takes place (they specify in advance how x increases with time) and that the initial number of adopters ceases to have an effect beyond a certain level. It is clear that our model is somewhat different even though the question addressed is similar. Mehta and Luck (1999) consider the statistical mechanical properties of a two-dimensional system motivated, in part, by conversations we have had on the model of this paper, though they incorporate several differences, including a "biasing" parameter that specifies how quickly agents using each technology (in our language) are ready to change; changes of technology also do not happen every period, another parameter is the extent of inertia for each type. Their analysis is done using an approximation technique called "pair approximation" and by simulation, and their results predict co-existence or clustering depending on the different parameter values. Our model is simpler, does not involve biasing parameters and we obtain exact results.
The analogous literature in probability theory is both extensive and deep and we will not survey it here, except to state that the usual modelling frame-work in this literature has the technology changing as a result of the proportion of neighbours using the other technology rather than as the proportion of successes (see,for example, the voter model, where either technology can prevail with probability 1). (This contrasts with the imitation of successful choices by neighbours in this paper.) While most of the work in "interacting particle systems" is in continuous time, Durrett (1988) also discusses some discrete-time models.
The probabilistic techniques we use are the properties of the random walk and the method of coupling that is also common in Markov chain theory. (See, for example, Chapter 14 in Aldous and Fill (2002) or Thorisson (2001) or Ross(1996) .) . . We do not need to use the properties of sub-additive processes.
As alluded to earlier, there is a considerable literature in economics both on diffusion of innovations and on learning from others. In the latter category are the papers of Anderlini and Ianni (1996) and (1997), Bala and Goyal (1998), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2000) , Ellison (1993) , Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) , Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Morris (2000) . (This is by no means an exhaustive list.) We discuss some of these papers in more detail below. Binmore and Samuelson (1997) is representative of a number of papers that use "aspiration-based" switching of strategies.This paper has the following "learning" model. A player gets a "learn-draw"at some point in time and only that player has an opportunity to learn (this is sometimes referred to as asynchronous updating ). He/she then compares his realised payoff with his current strategy to an aspiration level (this is analogous to a success in our learning rule L 1 ). If it is greater he does nothing. If it is less than the aspiration level, he chooses a random player from the (finite) population and imitates him with probability 1-λ; with probability λ, he chooses the strategy that the randomly chosen player is not playing. Our paper differs in the following respects: (1) In our paper, updating occurs for everyone every period. ( 2) The population is infinite. (3) The probability that the neighbour is imitated is not exogenous in our model; it depends on the performance of the two strategies in the neighbourhood of the agent who is considering changing.
Bala and Goyal (1998), whose paper has a very similar title to ours, in fact have a very different model. In their model, agents located at nodes in an infinite, connected graph choose an action with uncertain payoff. Though they are not completely rational, being myopic maximisers, they are rational learners in the sense of using Bayesian updating every period, so that all past experience is in fact taken into account. Our agents are memoryless and follow heuristics rather than maximising posterior expected utility. Bala and Goyal show convergence to the optimal action, given the updating rules and connectedness, for sufficiently dispersed prior probabilities and networks without "royal families". Of course, their assumptions have no counterpart in our (non-Bayesian) model.
The paper closest to ours in conception, though very different in execution, is Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) . They consider a continuum of identical players, each of whom chooses in each period the technology he or she will use in that period. The payoff of each technology is subject to stochastic shocks. A fraction of players keep using the same technology in the next period, but the complementary fraction "hears" of the experience of N randomly drawn other players and each member of this f(r)action switches to the technology with the higher average payoff, so long as both technologies are present in the sample. (Except for the agents that do not change, this learning rule is like our L 2 .) The state variable in this model is the aggregate proportion of individuals using the better technology. Ellison and Fudenberg study a local linearisation of this dynamical system and, in their theorem 2, characterise the conditions under which efficient social learning (of the better technology) will take place. In contrast to their paper, word-of-mouth in our paper is local (there is an explicit neighbourhood structure). The difference this causes might be thought of by interpreting their paper as one in which each player has N neighbours, whenever it is that player's turn to move (learn) and the neighbours change independently to a non-overlapping set of N each time the player moves. Thus while, if the player concerned learns, his or her choice depends on the neighbours, the choices made by the neighbours do not depend on his. (This is assuming the difference in payoffs of the technologies is constant. Ellison and Fudenberg actually vary this as well, with a "shock" common to all players, so agents' choices are in fact correlated.) Our results are therefore somewhat different from theirs, and we are able to look explicitly at the dynamics of the total configuration (an agent is at each site, and a configuration consists of a technology for each site), rather than at the aggregate proportion.
In an earlier, related paper, Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) discuss social learning. In the first part of their paper, which corresponds broadly to ours, the same technology is better for everyone. There is an initial proportion of people using this technology, with everyone being concentrated at one site.
Players in each period observe the payoffs of all available technologies in the previous period. Only an exogenously given proportion α are ready to learn, that is to change the technology being used to the one with higher payoff in the previous period. While Ellison and Fudenberg show that this learning process need not converge to the best technology, a sufficient degree of "popularity weighting" will lead to such a convergence. Popularity weighting is a reflection of past experience with each technology, since it uses the information of how popular a given technology is in addition to its payoff the previous period. Popularity weighting plays no role in our paper; agents know only their neighbours' realisations in each period. (In Ellison and Fudenberg, realisations are perfectly correlated so one can interpret their paper in our terms as each player always having access to the payoffs of both technologies in the previous period.) The reader will note that we do not require popularity weighting to obtain convergence to the better technology in our model.
The other papers are somewhat less related in conception, since they are concerned either with rational learning or with co-ordination games; however the papers of Anderlini and Ianni, Ellison and Morris do consider local interaction though in settings different from that of this paper. Our results cannot therefore be directly compared to theirs, except in the method of analysis. We use random walk and coupling arguments, which are different from the ones used in these other papers.
Technology Diffusion under Rule L 1
In this section, we show that if initially an agent at an integer site is independently assigned R with a strictly positive probability, and if R is more likely to yield a success than B does, then under rule L 1 every agent will use R eventually with probability 1.
Our approach to establish the convergence result can be outlined as follows. First we consider a special configuration, denoted by Config-[ 0 , r 0 ], 0 < r 0 , which initially has a single segment of consecutive red agents located at the integer points of interval [ 0 , r 0 ]. We show that, with a strictly positive probability, Config-[ 0 , r 0 ] will become all red before it is either absorbed by all blue or becomes a single red site. We then repeatedly couple the original process with a sequence of such configurations, Config-[
. ., consisting of only two consecutive red sites, so that as soon as one of those configurations is absorbed by all red, which occurs almost surely, the original process is also absorbed by all red.
The details are given in the following two subsections.
Config
This section studies a special configuration that initially has a single segment of i consecutive red sites and all other sites blue (the locations of those red sites are immaterial since the line extends to infinity in both directions). We show that such a configuration has the property that before it becomes either all red or all blue, the two absorbing states, it always contains a single segment of consecutive red sites. We then show that for i ≥ 2, the configuration has a positive probability to become
. .}, both probabilities. For convenience, we call a site a R-site (a B-site) in period t if the agent located at that site uses R (B). A segment of consecutive R-sites (B-sites) will be called a R-interval (a B-interval). We say a configuration in period t is in state x
t = [ t , r t ], t ≤ r t ,
if the entire line is blue except the R-interval
Let |x t | = r t − t + 1 be the cardinality of x t , which is understood as the number of R-sites in interval [ t , r t ], t = 0, 1, . . . . We also say the configuration is in state B (R) if the entire line is blue (red). Here and in the sequel, the configuration with initial state
Under learning rule L 1 , if the outcome of agent i's chosen technology in period t is a success, then he uses the same technology in period t + 1. If the outcome of his experiment in period t is a failure, and if at least one of his neighboring sites using the alternative technology is a success, then agent i switches to the alternative technology in period t + 1. More specifically, the switching probabilities of the central agent i under rule L 1 are as follows: 
It is worth noting that, if the neighbours of the central agents use different technologies, such as in cases (2) and (3), then the central agent, say B in BBR, only needs to learn from his right neighbouring site R, and switches to R in period t + 1 if B is a failure and R is a success in period t.
Our first lemma shows that under rule
In other words, a configuration starting with a single R-interval always consists of a single R-interval as time evolves until absorption by B, if that event ever occurs. 
Associated with Markov chain
Evidently, the cardinality process{|X t |, 
where T i = ∞ if the above event never occurs. Then, for i = 2, 3, . . . , 
The mean of Y 1 t works out to be
Now consider |X t | ≥ 2. In Lemma 1 (2), we have shown that |X t+1 | depends on the successes and failures of the two leftmost sites and the two rightmost sites of BR R · · · R RB, since all other sites do not switch technolo- 
and the expectation
Now consider (4). We have
where the stopping time T i is defined in (3) . First note that the second probability on the right hand side (RHS) of (8) must be zero, since a configuration starting with a finite R-interval and with the maximum net gain less than or equal to 2 in each period cannot be absorbed by R in a finite time T i < ∞. Thus (8) reduces to
Equation (9) is the probability that the Markov chain
To prove this probability is strictly positive, observe that the Markov chain is equivalent to the following random walk on Z + : The random walk starts in state i ∈ {2, 3, . . .} and has Feller (1971) ) that such a random walk either drifts to +∞ in equilibrium or is absorbed by states {0, 1}, both with strictly positive probabilities, say γ i and 1 − γ i , respectively. This proves (8) and henceforth (4). symbols, Similarly, (5) can be written as (10) where P (|X T i | ∈ {0, 1}, T i = ∞ |X 0 | = i) = 0 because {T i = ∞} means that the chain never visits states {0, 1} and then the random walk result states that the chain at {T i = ∞} must drift to +∞. The last equation of (10) corresponds to the probability that the aforementioned random walk is absorbed by states {0, 1}, which equals 1 − γ i as we have shown. This proves (5). 
The next proposition states that given
Proof. First note that since the line extends to infinity in both directions, the probabilities given in (11) and (12) depend only on the cardinality of X 0 and are independent of the location of X 0 . Therefore,
and similarly in (11) we can replace
where we have used (4), (10) and the fact that
∞} is an impossible event and thus has a null probability. Therefore, to prove (11), we need to show
In other words, if the cardinality of a R-interval is +∞, then the boundaries of the R-interval must extend to infinity in both directions. Toward this end, note from (8) that see Feller 1971 ) that such a random walk drifts to −∞ as t → ∞, with probability 1. Thus
Similarly, 
Combining (16) and (17),
This proves (15) and also (11) . The proof of (12) is analogous and we omit the details.
Sequential Coupling
We assume that in the original configuration, each agent on the line is independently assigned R(= 1) with probability 0 < q R < 1 and B(= 0) with probability 1 − q R , at time 0. For convenience, we call the original process that starts with a randomly assigned technology at each site Config-O. It is clear that Config-O at time 0 has infinitely many R-intervals with their cardinalities at least 2. The proof in this section proceeds as follows. From the original process (Config-O), which is denoted byZ t , t = 0, 1, . . . , we choose an interval of all reds that has a cardinality of at least two at t = 0. We couple this with an auxiliary process that has only two reds at time 0 and is "covered" by the interval chosen from the original process, in the sense of having blues wherever the original process had blues. The first part of the proof demonstrates that we can find a coupling such that if this covering holds at time t,it holds for t + 1.To this end a processẐ t is constructed such that the marginal distributions ofẐ t andZ t are the same for all t, and the location of the chosen red interval is the same in both processes at t = 0. By appropriately choosing random variables that move together in the two coupled processes, the construction maintains the covering property for all t for the adjunct process that has an interval with only two reds at time 0. The existence of such a sample path inequality is equivalent to a distributional inequality in which the leftmost point of the original interval at time t is stochastically less than the leftmost point of the interval that started with only two reds and the rightmost point is stochastically greater. Thus the process starting with two reds serves as a stochastic lower bound for the evolution of the chosen red interval in the original process. We know the size-two interval either goes to infinity with positive probability or is absorbed in a size-1 or size-0 state with positive probability. If the latter happens, we restart with a new red interval of cardinality at least two in the original process and so on. 
where X = st Y means that X and Y are equal in distribution. (19) . Then, for any
Lemma 4 LetX
0 = [˜ 0 ,r 0 ],r 0 >˜ 0 ,
be a R-interval from Config-O at time 0 and letX t = [L t ,R t ] be the location of the R-interval at time t, where we take the convention thatL t >R t indicates that the R-interval no longer exists at time t. Let Config-[
Proof. We shall construct a configuration, call it Config-Ô, governed by the Markov chain {Ẑ t , t = 0, 1, . . . , T 2 Ẑ 0 =Z 0 }, such that it obeys the same probability law as {Z t , t = 0, 1, . . . , T 2 }:
but, for
andL t ≤ L t with probability 1.
Similarly,R
andR t ≥ R t with probability 1,
is the location of the R interval, with initial location
, at time t in Config-Ô. Then, from the result of stochastic ordering (see, e.g., Proposition 9.2.2, Ross 1996), (25) - (28) imply (21) and (22), respectively. Our sample path construction proceeds on t. Equations (23)-(28) hold trivially for t = 0, due to (20) . Next we show (23)-(28) hold for t + 1, based on the hypotheses they hold for t. To constructL t+1 andR t+1 , we couple sites BR located at sites {L t − 1,L t } in Config-Ô with sites BR located {L t − 1, L t } in Config-[ 0 , 0 + 1] so that they yield the identical outcomes at time t. Similarly, we couple sites RB located at sites {R t ,R t +1} in Config-Ô with sites RB located {R t , R t + 1} in Config-[ 0 , 0 + 1] so that they yield the identical outcomes at time t. Note that the left and right boundary couplings do not interfere with each other because for 0 ≤ t < T 2 , the cardinalities of the R-intervals in both configurations are at least two. Let any other site in Config-Ô, except for the two left-boundary sites and the two right-boundary sites identified above, have its own realization of experimental outcome at time t, independent of everything else.
Due to the Markov property, the probability law governingẐ t+1 (Z t+1 ) depends only onẐ t (Z t ) and their experimental outcomes at time t. From our hypothesis, (23) holds for t − 1:
In addition, the couplings prescribed above ensure that the experimental outcomes ofẐ t are stochastically identical to that ofZ t . Therefore,
which proves (23) for t + 1. 
Next we prove (27)-(28). Due to symmetry, (25)-(26) can be shown analogously. Toward this end, letŶ
In addition,R t is independent ofŶ R t , sinceŶ R t depends only on the output of the siteR t (that is,Ẑ t,R t ) but not the locationR t itself. Similarly,Ỹ R t is independent ofR t . Then, from (27) and (30), 
this establishes (28) for t + 1, and also our induction proof. 
. Such a selection is possible because there are infinitely many R-intervals with their cardinalities at least 2 at time 0 and those R-intervals cannot all disappear or become a single R-site in a finite time T 
and for j = 1, 2, . . . , J,
, with probability 1, we conclude
Here there is no initial red interval of length at least 2 so we cannot begin the sequential coupling immediately. However, it is clear that, with probability 1, there will be infinitely many red intervals of length at least 2 from the next period onwards. We begin the first coupling at this time and our sequential coupling approach can still apply. so on.
Technology Diffusion under Rule L 2
Under learning rule L 2 , agent i performs his experiment, observes what technology i − 1, i + 1 and, of course, i himself are using, and also whether these neighbouring agents obtained successes or failures. If i is using R, and the proportion of successes of agents in his neighbourhood using B is strictly greater than the proportion of successes of agents using R, i switches to B in the next period and similarly for any agent using B. The switching probabilities of the central agent i under rule L 2 are as follows: 
Note that only under cases (2) and (3) f, s, s, f ) , then in the next period those sites will change to RBRB, resulting in a red "hole" between two blues.
Another property of rule L 1 , which is essential to our sequential coupling approach in Section 2, is that if the
Config-Ô at time t, then we are able to construct a coupling such that X t+1 is again "covered" byX t+1 at time t + 1, with probability 1 (see Lemma 4) . This property is invalid under rule L 2 . For example, suppose R t =R t , and the four sites located at
and Config-Ô at time t are, respectively, RRBB and RRBR. Suppose the outcome of those four sites in both configurations are (s, s, s, f ). Then under L 2 , RRBB in Config-[ 0 , r 0 ] will change to RRRB and RRBR in Config-Ô will change to RRBB, and X t+1 is no longer covered byX t+1 at the right boundary at time t + 1.
To overcome the above difficulties, we modify rule L 2 for Config-[ 0 , r 0 ] as follows:
M1. If the outcomes of RRBB (BBRR) located at the right (left) boundary of X t in Config-[ 0 , r 0 ] are (f, s, s, f ), which occur with probability
, then we let RRBB (BBRR) become RBBB (BBBR) in the next period. In other words, whenever a R-interval splits at the boundary of the interval we will change the rightmost (leftmost) red site to blue. (2) . Also redefine T i as the stopping time of the event
where T i = ∞ if the above event never occurs. The next lemma can be considered as an extension of Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
If
p R 1−p 2 R > p B 1−p B , then for i ≥ 4, P (|X T i | = +∞ |X 0 | = i) := γ i > 0,(35)P (|X T i | < 4 |X 0 | = i) = 1 − γ i .(36)
Proof. We only prove (1), the proof of (2) is similar to that of Proposition 3.
Under the modified L 2 , |X t+1 | depends on the successes and failures of the four leftmost sites and the four rightmost sites of BBRR R · · · R RRBB. 
where the first equality holds because the event Y 
Thus the above expectation is positive as long as
Next consider the original configuration, Config-O, under rule L 2 , where at time 0 each agent on the line is independently assigned R with probability 0 < q R < 1 and B with probability 1 − q R . Let {Z t , t = 0, 1, . . .} be similarly defined as in Section 2 but under rule L 2 . LetX 0 = [˜ 0 ,r 0 ],r 0 −˜ 0 ≥ 4, be one of the R-intervals from Config-O at time 0. As time evolves, the location of the R-interval at time t + 1 ≥ 1 is given by 
Let T 4 be defined by (34) . If
Proof. Our approach to establish the result is analogous to that of Lemma 4, the only difference is that the coupling is constructed differently.
As in the proof of Lemma 4, we construct Config-Ô, governed by the Markov chain {Ẑ t , t = 0, 1, . . . , T 4 Ẑ 0 =Z 0 }, such that it obeys the same probability law as {Z t , t = 0, 1, . . . , T 4 }:
but, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T 4 ,
andR t = stRt andR t ≥ R t with probability 1,
whereX t = [L t ,R t ] is the location of the R-interval at time t, with initial locationX 0 =X 0 in Config-Ô. We emphasize that as in Config-O, rule L 2 is implemented in Config-Ô.
From (42), (45)- (47) are trivially true for t = 0. Next we show (45)-(47) hold for t + 1, based on the hypothesis that they hold for t. Our coupling is constructed based on the configurations of the boundary sites ofX t and X t , as follows. We couple the outcomes of RRB (BRR) at sites
in Config-Ô so that they yield the identical outcomes at time t. In addition, if the color at siteR t + 2 (siteL t − 2) in Config-Ô is B, we couple its outcome with that of B at site R t + 2 (site L t − 2) in Config-[ 0 , 0 + 3] so that their outcomes are identical; if the color at siteR t + 2 (siteL t − 2) in Config-Ô is R, we couple its outcome with that of B at site
is a success then R in Config-Ô is also a success, at time t. This coupling is possible because p R > p B . Let any other site in Config-Ô or Config-[ 0 , 0 + 3], except for the four left-boundary sites and the four right-boundary sites identified above, have its own outcome at time t, independent of everything else.
Next we show (45) and (47) hold for t + 1; the proof of (46) for t + 1is analogous to that of (47). LetŶ 
which proves (45) and the first equation in (47) for t + 1, respectively. Next we prove the second expression of (47) for t + 1. For this, we consider several possible outcomes of the four coupled sites in the two configurations at time t.
• 
The above events imply that
and it further implieŝ
where in the last inequality we used the hypothesisR t ≥ R t with probability 1. This establishes the second part of (47) for t + 1, and also our induction proof.
The next theorem states that if
, then R prevails with probability 1 in Config-O, as t → ∞. Its proof is similar to that of Theorem 5 and we omit the details.
Theorem 8 If
, then Config-O under L 2 will be absorbed by R as t → ∞, with probability 1.
Following the remark given at the end of Section 3, one sees that the result of this section is still valid for any initial configuration of Config-O with infinite number of reds.
4 Rates of convergence of L 1 and L 2 .
In this section, we report briefly on simulations done with the two learning rules on a finite model. One thousand sites were considered, placed on the circumference of a circle. The parameters of the model were p R = 0.6, p B = 0.5, which do not satisfy the sufficient condition used in our proof for L 2 to converge. The initial conditions were chosen in three ways as follows. (i) Alternate sites were assigned red and blue technologies, so there were 500 red and 500 blue, but no interval of red of size greater than 1. (ii) Randomly assigned technologies, each with probability 0.5. (iii)500 sites next to each other were assigned red and the remaining sites blue technologies (thus there were "blocks" of contiguous reds and blues. The results, summarized in the following tables and figures, are based on 200 simulation runs for each initial configuration. The figures below also demonstrate this effect. Fig. 1 illustrates the alternate initial condition, fig. 2 the random initial condition and fig. 3 the block initial condition.The heavier line represents L 1 and the thinner one rule L 2 .
(Insert figures 1,2,3 here.)
While the breakup of a single red interval under rule L 2 posed a problem for our method of proof using the sequential coupling argument, it seems plausible that by increasing the number of "borders" where the successful technology could have a demonstration effect, it might in fact facilitate quick convergence. Estimates for the rate of convergence are difficult to obtain except for the block case under L 1 , where the expected motion of the random walk (.2 in the simulation) suggests that, on average, it would take 2,500 periods to absorb 500 blues and that this would happen linearly. Finally, a finite number of sites around a circle is obviously not the same as the set of positiive and negative integers on the line. In the finite case, there are two absorbing states and either can be reached with positive probability from the interior. The results of this paper show this is not the case with integer sites on the line. We should therefore exercise some care in extrapolating the simulation results from the circle to the infinite one-dimensional lattice. Given this caveat, the circle is the best discrete approximation to such a lattice.
One reason for doing this simulation was to obtain some comparative results on the two learning rules studied here. While the theoretical part of our paper needs more demanding sufficient conditions to prove that L 2 converges to the better technology than we need for L 1 , this is not evidence that one learning rule is better than the other. L 1 involves more inertia than L 2 so such a finding would have some nice economic interpretation, if it were to be obtained.
Conclusion
This paper has considered two simple rules of learning by imitation by which (extremely) boundedly rational agents can learn from their own experiences and the experience of others in their neighbourhood on the integers. The two rules are very similar; the basic difference is that in the first case an agent who succeeds does not want to "fix what isn't broken" and does not change his action, while in the second each agent, no matter what the realisation of his or her own experiment, takes into account the experiences of neighbours in deciding what to do next. We are able to prove that the first rule leads to diffusion of the better technology with probability 1; the second, however, converges in the same way if the better technology is sufficiently better. These are sufficient conditions; the simulation results reported in the last section indicate that these should not be interpreted as evidence that the second learning rule is worse than the first in terms of rate of diffusion. An interesting open question is to get stronger results on the learning rule L 2 .
We initially began this paper looking at two-dimensional lattices. However, we do not know if a similar result holds in this case. This is a topic for future work. Our conjecture is that a result similar to the one we have in this paper holds for two dimensions as well, but this remains to be shown.
As a final item in the discussion, we consider a point raised by the anonymous referee relating to more general payoffs than the ones considered in this paper. If the payoff distribution from the Red technology stochastically dominates the Blue technology and the distribution of payoffs for both are absolutely continuous, then we can choose an arbitrary cutoff value and consider payoffs above it to be Successes and below it to be Failures, so long as the probability of "Success" is strictly greater with Red than with Blue, and everything in this paper would go through. What if the payoff distributions were not stochastically ordered? The referee gives an example where Red gives a success with probability 0.5 but the payoff from success is only 1, while Blue gives a success with probability 0.4 but a payoff if there is a success of 1.5. Thus Blue is a better technology but the process we consider in this paper will converge to all Red with probability 1. Here "Success" is any outcome strictly greater than 0 and "Failure" is a payoff of 0. If payoffs were observable, one could alternatively define "Success" as a payoff greater than 1, and the process would converge to all Blue instead. The interesting feature of this example is that the chosen cutoff makes a difference to the ultimate result and individuals with low cutoffs are likely to get stuck using the worse technology. The referee's example also suggests that future research would be fruitful in addressing the question of cutoff levels and learning by imitation. 
